Public Meeting

The Social and Economic Effects of the **Tasi Mane Project**

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Tasi Mane Petroleum Infrastructure Project • TL began working on the Tasi Mane petroleum corridor in 2010.

- The project is in the 2011-2030 Strategic Development Plan.
- According to MPRM, the project will cost up to \$14-\$15 billion.

"To bring petroleum development to our shores and provide economic profit from petroleum industry activities..." (SDP)



Social and Environmental Impacts

- Takes over farming land
- Threatens agricultural productivity
- Many people lose their land, must find new sources of income
- About 230 hectares for refinery
- 1300 hectares for SSB and Nova Suai

- Potential for resistance and social conflict in the community
- Pollution of water, land, sea and air
- Threatens biodiversity (TL is part of Wallacea Region of SE Asia)
- Threatens cultural values of the community

Components of the TMP SUAI

Suai Supply Base

- RDTL just signed a contract for \$719,212,000 with Hyundai Engineering and Construction to build the SSB.
- This is more than the state has spent on education from 2002 until today.
- There are more than \$50 million in other contracts.







Economic Predictions

- MPRM assumes that Bayu-Undan (BU) spends \$500 million each year on goods and services; half of this will be for goods.
- SSB can mark-up goods that it handles by perhaps 10%.
- Therefore, if MPRM's assumptions are correct, the SSB could take in \$25m per year from a large project like Bayu-Undan.
- If 2/3 of this goes for taxes, operational and personnel costs, that leaves \$8m/year for profit and to repay capital investment.

Refinery in Betano

- TimorGAP wants to build a 'small' refinery which can process 30,000 barrels of crude oil (condensate) per day.
- The design was originally based on the production of Bayu-Undan, but now expects crude to come from Greater Sunrise.
- Investment cost: TimorGAP estimates \$1 billion, but La'o Hamutuk's research shows \$2 billion or more.

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
- If BU uses SSB for five more years (it will run dry in 2020), this is \$40m net revenue (leaving \$679 to recover from other fields).
- Another field about the size of BU, operating for 20 years, will produce \$160m in net revenue.
- Therefore, SSB needs at least five new fields the size of Bayu-Undan just to break even.

How much will be sold to the local market?

- TL plans to sell 30% of refinery products in the country and export 70% to international markets.
- In 2015, Government allocated \$92m for EDTL fuel and \$12m to fuel state vehicles.
- The country imported \$160m worth of fuel in 2014.

(2013)			
HS Code	Goods Description	Country Of Origin	Value (\$U5)
27101931	DIESEL	Malaysia	62,678,53
27101931		Talwan.	22,067,94
27101931		Singapore	15,230,37
27101931		HongKong	8,806,13
27101931		Indones b	5,656,54
otal 27101931			114, 439,53
27101131	Motor Spirit	indonesia	13,720,4
27101131		Taiwan	8,002,6
27101131		Australia	- M 19
Total 27101131			21,723,1
HS Code	Goods Description	Country Of Origin	Value (SUS
27101921	Jet Fuel	Australia	1,721,25
27101921		Singapore	592,5
27101921		United Kingdom	144,30
27101921		France	1,7
27101921		Indonesia	- 1
Total 27 101921			2,459,90





Petroleum in Timor-Leste

- Bayu-Undan will be empty by 2020.
- Future of Sunrise is uncertain.
- We could import from abroad, but cannot control prices
- In the past two decades, Kitan is the only new commercially valuable discovery.
- TL has not held a bidding round since 2006 because oil companies are not interested.

Challenges to get input crude

- Refinery market highly competitive. Refineries with good management, strategic location, and accessible logistics can be profitable.
- There may be no source of crude oil after Bayu-Undan is empty. Greater Sunrise's "situation" excludes it from planning
- TL could try to buy crude oil from projects in Australia or elsewhere.
- Other countries have their own refineries can TL compete?

Where can TL sell its products? What are they worth?

Joint venture with PTT - Thailand

- PTT will sell TL refinery products to its markets.
- How will profits be divided between TimorGAP and PTT?
 - **How much will TimorGAP pay to Timor-Leste?**
- This will reduce "profit oil" taxes from Sunrise.
- If TimorGAP receives profit oil in kind, this will reduce state revenues which would have gone into the Petroleum Fund and state budget.

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- But TL will not be able to add value to its own condensate if the refining margin is too small.
 - In that case, the State Budget will have to subsidize capital or operating costs.
- If the project depends on Sunrise, the contract must ensure that TL can get our production share "in-kind."
- Will Sunrise's gas and oil go somewhere else?

Without PTT

- TL's products must compete with those from refineries in Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore.
- TL must clearly understand and explain the relationships between the refinery, LNG plant and supply base.

Projections

- A typical refinery works on a refining margin of \$5-6 per barrel.
- High operational and capital costs will reduce profitability
- If:
 - Capital investment in the refinery is \$1 billion
 - It processes 30,000 barrels per day for 30 years
 - The refining margin (mark-up) is \$5/barrel
- Therefore \$3/barrel will pay for recovering capital investment, even with no interest or profit.
- If operating costs are more than \$2/barrel, the refinery will lose money.
- If the refinery need a larger margin, it will sell its products at higher than market prices. Should Timor-Leste subsidize them?

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LNG Plant in Beaçu

- Totally depends on pipeline from Sunrise.
- Woodside has shelved the Sunrise project.
- TL recently awarded a \$3.8m contract to Foster Wheeler Energy from U.K. to prepare a preliminary design.
- TL does not have the capacity to finance this project which could cost \$9 billion or more by ourselves.
- Companies may be interested after Sunrise's future is certain and when T-LNG is approved.

La'o Hamutuk's Recommendations

- Postpone the Tasi Mane Project until it is certain that the Sunrise pipeline will to come to TL.
- Do not keep working on TMP until new commercially viable oil/gas fields are discovered.
- TL must review the costs and benefits of TMP.
- If TMP is commercially viable, the private sector should invest its own money and share the risk.
- We should give more attention to other sectors to achieve sustainable and equitable development.

Problems with the Tasi Mane project

- It makes TL more dependent on oil and gas, crowding out sustainable development sectors.
- Dubious concepts and planning; it is unlikely to provide a reasonable return on investment.
- Nearly all the money spent will go to foreign companies, providing hardly any local jobs or subcontracts.
- It will create social conflict, take up land, displace people, worsen health and degrade and endanger the environment.
- It will be a burden on our local economy.
- What if Sunrise gas doesn't come to Timor-Leste?

Obrigado

For more information, please go to:

- La'o Hamutuk's website http://www.laohamutuk.org
- La'o Hamutuk's blog http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

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